Fictionalists disregard the dynamic nature of scientific models. Models in the perspective of distributed cognition
Capitolo di libro
Data di Pubblicazione:
2020
Abstract:
In the current epistemological debate scientific models are not only considered
as useful devices for explaining facts or discovering new entities, laws, and
theories, but also rubricated under various new labels: from the classical ones, as
abstract entities and idealizations, to the more recent, as fictions, surrogates, credible
worlds, missing systems, make-believe, parables, functional, epistemic actions,
revealing capacities. An influential article by JohnWoods, entitled “Against fictionalism”
(Woods 2013), usefully provides a rich argumentation concerning the puzzling
problems created by the use of the concept of fiction in philosophy, epistemology, and
logic,Woods himself further deepened in the recent book Truth in Fiction: Rethinking
Its Logic (Woods 2018). By limiting my treatment to the case of models in science, I
would like to offer an additional support to this perspective, emphasizing the unsatisfactory
character of this intellectual recent trend, and the uselessness of the concept
of fiction in illustrating the scientific enterprise. I will contend that it is misleading
to analyze models in science by disregarding the dynamic aspects: scientific models
in a static perspective (for example when inserted in a textbook) certainly appear
fictional to the epistemologist, but their fictional character disappears if a dynamic
perspective is adopted. The article also sketches the role of models in science taking
advantage of the concept of “epistemic warfare”, which sees scientific enterprise as
a complicated struggle for rational knowledge in which it is crucial to distinguish
epistemic (for example scientific models) from non epistemic (for example fictions,
falsities, propaganda) weapons. A reference to the usefulness of Feyerabend’s counterinduction
in criticizing the role of resemblance in model-based cognition is also
provided, to further corroborate the thesis indicated by the article title.
as useful devices for explaining facts or discovering new entities, laws, and
theories, but also rubricated under various new labels: from the classical ones, as
abstract entities and idealizations, to the more recent, as fictions, surrogates, credible
worlds, missing systems, make-believe, parables, functional, epistemic actions,
revealing capacities. An influential article by JohnWoods, entitled “Against fictionalism”
(Woods 2013), usefully provides a rich argumentation concerning the puzzling
problems created by the use of the concept of fiction in philosophy, epistemology, and
logic,Woods himself further deepened in the recent book Truth in Fiction: Rethinking
Its Logic (Woods 2018). By limiting my treatment to the case of models in science, I
would like to offer an additional support to this perspective, emphasizing the unsatisfactory
character of this intellectual recent trend, and the uselessness of the concept
of fiction in illustrating the scientific enterprise. I will contend that it is misleading
to analyze models in science by disregarding the dynamic aspects: scientific models
in a static perspective (for example when inserted in a textbook) certainly appear
fictional to the epistemologist, but their fictional character disappears if a dynamic
perspective is adopted. The article also sketches the role of models in science taking
advantage of the concept of “epistemic warfare”, which sees scientific enterprise as
a complicated struggle for rational knowledge in which it is crucial to distinguish
epistemic (for example scientific models) from non epistemic (for example fictions,
falsities, propaganda) weapons. A reference to the usefulness of Feyerabend’s counterinduction
in criticizing the role of resemblance in model-based cognition is also
provided, to further corroborate the thesis indicated by the article title.
Tipologia CRIS:
2.1 Contributo in volume (Capitolo o Saggio)
Keywords:
Fictions · Fictionalism · Scientific models · Model-based reasoning ·
Dynamics of scientific knowledge · Static view of science
Elenco autori:
Magnani, Lorenzo
Link alla scheda completa:
Titolo del libro:
Cognition in 3E: Emergent, Embodied, Extended Multidisciplinary Perspectives
Pubblicato in: