On the epistemic blameworthiness of the consumers of disinformation. Why should we bother?

In this paper, I address the question of why it is important to inquire into the epistemic
blameworthiness of the consumers of disinformation. In response, I defend the claim,
recently challenged by A. Worsnip, that this question is relevant for the second
question of how the problem of disinformation should be effectively dealt with. Against
Wornsip's explicit argument to the contrary, I defend an account of epistemic
blameworthiness from which it follows that the strategy of endeavouring to educate
blameworthy disinformation consumers holds promise. Moreover, I defend the claim
that the blameworthiness of disinformation consumers is also relevant for the question
of whether attempting to educate them, above and beyond an effective strategy, would
be a fair way to fix the problem. In the final part, I address the complication that unfair
educational strategies may still prove useful, and so be all-things-considered justified, if
better alternatives are not available.