Value-freeness and Value-neutrality in the Analysis of Political Concepts

Political philosophers attempt to give coherent accounts of power, freedom, justice, rights, democracy, and other concepts that feature in our discussions about the nature, explanation and desirability of certain political phenomena. In doing so, they engage in a kind of conceptual analysis. This article addresses the role of ethical evaluation can and ought to play in such analysis. In particular, it defends the use of value-free and value-neutral concepts in political philosophy. Some of the reasons for working with such concepts have been overlooked, owing to a failure to make certain relevant distinctions. This failure has brought about a misleading polarization of the debate: on the one side, there are those who affirm the possibility and usefulness of defining certain political concepts in a way that is wholly detached from any ethical concerns; on the other side, there are those who deny the usefulness or even the possibility of a value-free or value-neutral analysis of any of the concepts that figure in our normative political discourse.

The article aims to remedy this situation by making the following distinctions. First, it distinguishes between value-freeness and value-neutrality. Value-freeness concerns the place (or rather, the absence) of evaluative terms in the definition of a concept, whereas value-neutrality involves a suspension of judgment about the comparative merits of a particular set of divergent ethical positions. Each of these two features is a methodological desideratum in the case of certain concepts in certain theoretical contexts. Sometimes, it is appropriate to adopt an empirical approach to the analysis and definition of a concept, and this requires value-free definitions. Sometimes, it is appropriate to adopt an ethically non-committal approach, and this requires a degree of value-neutrality. The two approaches can be combined, but they can also come apart. Second, the article distinguishes between between value-freeness and value-neutrality, on the one hand, and the complete detachment of our analysis from all ethical concerns, on the other. The latter idea is termed ‘value-independence’. One can have ethical reasons for adopting an empirical approach to the analysis and definition of a given concept, and one can have ethical reasons for adopting an approach that is non-committal with respect to a given set of ethical positions. Thus, neither value-freeness nor value-neutrality need be motivated by a desire to detach one’s analysis from all ethical concerns. Value-independence might imply value-freeness and value-neutrality, but the converse is certainly not the case. Finally, the article distinguishes two kinds of value-neutrality: normative value-neutrality (exemplified by Rawlsian 'conception' of justice as fairness), and metatheoretical value-neutrality (exemplified by MacCallum's abtract concept of freedom).