Multilevel inconsistencies in environmental taxation: some evidence from the Italian case

Environmental taxes, or at least some of them, are strongly interrelated with the territorial sphere, and, accordingly, can represent an effective means for making citizens pay for the services they benefit from, or for the external effects they generate. In this perspective, the proper distribution of competences in a system with several levels of government becomes a key issue. The main analytical question is to comparatively evaluate which are the advantages involved in policy decentralization and taxation and which are the critical aspects to be tackled. In the Italian case, the Constitutional framework establishes that environmental matters are included among the exclusive competencies of the national government. At the same time, according to the fiscal federalism discipline, regions can introduce new taxes for their own or for local governments, but only respecting the general principles set by the national government in terms of fiscal coordination. The chapter will investigate how this complex and ambiguous multilevel framework of competences is jeopardizing the opportunity to use environmentally related levies in an effective and rational way.