508209 - PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (C.P.)

courses

ID:

508209

Duration (hours):

36

CFU:

SSD:

FILOSOFIA E TEORIA DEI LINGUAGGI

Year:

2025

Date/time interval

Secondo Semestre (23/02/2026 - 22/05/2026)

Course Objectives

The course aims to introduce students to contemporary philosophical debates on skepticism and to highlight their connections with the themes of epistemic trust and conspiracy thinking. More specifically, the learning objectives are: 1. To provide an in-depth understanding of the main arguments and positions concerning skepticism in contemporary philosophy. 2. To offer conceptual tools for understanding the role of epistemic trust in the construction and maintenance of knowledge, both at the individual and collective level. 3. To develop the ability to apply philosophical notions and theories to the formulation and evaluation of arguments regarding the possibility of knowledge—both of external reality in general and of social reality in particular. 4. To critically examine the phenomenon of conspiracy thinking as a case study of the tensions between justified skepticism and epistemically harmful suspicion, with special attention to its impact on contemporary public debate.

Course Prerequisites

Having passed Philosophy of Language is preferable.

Teaching Methods

The course combines lectures with student-led seminars, in which participants will present and discuss selected texts and arguments introduced during the lectures.

Assessment Methods

Seminar presentations during the course and a final oral examination to assess both the knowledge of the course content and the ability to apply that knowledge

Texts

Beyer, A. (2020). Trust and antitrust. Synthese, 197(1), 339–357. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01922-1 Hume, D. (1748). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Sections X–XI). Keeley, B. L. (1999). Of conspiracy theories. The Journal of Philosophy, 96(3), 109–126. https://doi.org/10.2307/2564659 Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4), 549–567. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347521 Origgi, G. (2012). Epistemic vigilance and epistemic trust. In Epistemology and the Social World. Routledge. Piazza, T. (2011). Hume’s argument against miracles. In B. Brue & S. Barbone (Eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy (pp. xx–xx). Blackwell. Piazza, T. (2017). Che s’è la conoscenza [What Is Knowledge]. Rome: Carocci. (Ch. 5). Sunstein, C. R., & Vermeule, A. (2009). Conspiracy theories: Causes

The course will begin with an examination of some fundamental epistemological notions—such as knowledge, justification, epistemic trust, and testimony—in order to provide students with the necessary conceptual tools. It will then introduce the main arguments that shape contemporary discussions on skepticism. Special attention will be devoted to David Hume’s argument, according to which, although it is not impossible that a miracle might have occurred, we can never truly know it nor hold justified beliefs concerning its occurrence. Subsequently, the course will explore the notion of epistemic trust, understood as a necessary condition for the acquisition and transmission of knowledge, before turning to the theme of conspiracy thinking. In this final section, we will address both the definitional issue—what counts as a conspiracy theory—and the epistemological question regarding the rationality and credibility of such theories.