Constructing Reality. The "Operationalization" of Bateson’s Conjecture on Cognition

Strictly following the direction outlined by Bateson, this study (which expands
and completes some ideas presented, although in another context, in Mella 2014)
seeks to operationalize Bateson’s Conjecture on Cognition, proposing three objectives:
(1) above all, to make Bateson’s definition of “mind” operative; by introducing
simple symbols, I show how it is possible for any “mind” – not necessarily only
the human one – to construct descriptions of objects and definitions of concepts by
simply making use of “primitive” operations involving comparison, the identification
of differences, and analogy; the symbols introduced give a meaning to the
observation, identification, and comparison of “objects” and “concepts,” which will
allow me to formalize several models or moments that operationalize the concept of
“cognition”; (2) to apply the same conceptual framework to define the process of
denomination through which the “mind” manages to represent objects (descriptions)
and concepts (definitions) through “signs” (descriptions of signs) and “signifiers”
(definitions of signs), thereby forming semes; (3) to apply the symbols and the
concepts of description, definition, and denomination to operationally deal with the
problem of “truth” as correspondence, making use of a reliable process of determination.
To achieve these objectives, a simple formal symbology is proposed to represent
the basic elements of cognition and communication to demonstrate how the
cognitive process can be linked to a succession of acts entailing distinction, description,
definition, and recognition.
More specifically, based on the notion of Observative Dimension, the Observative
Universe is defined as a vector of dimensions through which the “mind” filters reality
and constructs a Technical Description (not yet adopting specific language) as a
vector of the states of those dimensions determined for a specific object “O.” Thanks
to the innate process of analogy and analogical generalization, the “mind” starts
from descriptions repeated for a set of objects – held to be analogous, though different
– to arrive at the Technical Definition of a “general object O∗,” which, in fact,
represents the concept (idea) of O∗ as well as the meaning (signified) of the signs
that denote it. Knowing the world means carrying out descriptions of “O” and constructing
definitions of “O∗” as the class of all “Os” recognized as elements (examples)
of “O∗.” The same symbology is applied to define the basic elements of the
process of “linguistic denomination” and the formation of languages through a “signification
process” that couples a technical definition of “O∗,” which represents the
signified of the “general sign S∗,” to the technical definition of “S∗,” which represents
the signifier of “O∗.” Communication is the basis for the arguments made in
the final part of the book, which demonstrates that even the Tarskian correspondence-
truth “‘the snow is white’ is true if and only if the snow is white” requires
processes of definition and description which are at the basis of knowledge.
Therefore, operationalizing Bateson’s hypothesis means proposing a formalized
and coherent structure of propositions that form an interpretative theory of the
modus operandi of the (human) “mind.” This structure of propositions will be useful
not only in shedding light on our cognitive processes but also in laying the formal
groundwork for artificial intelligence.
To make the operationalization process efficient, I used some typical models
(Rings) of control systems (mentioned in a short APPENDIX) that make knowledge
and learning p